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One of the puzzles of macroeconomic policy analysis is the extent to which the
importance of pay-as-you-go retirement systems varies across countries in the devel-
oped world. Table 1, which presents effective tax rates for these systems in the largest
countries of the OECD, shows that, in 2002, they varied from 5 % in Australia to 36 %
in Italy.
Analysts have sought to explain this diversity in different ways. Some have argued
that it reflects historical differences, such as differences in the degree of social conflict
and the power of unions.1 Others have suggested that it is the mark of cultural factors,
some societies being more risk averse than others, and thus more intent on ensuring the
stability of retirement incomes.
We seek to demonstrate that pay-as-you-go (henceforth paygo) effective contribu-
tion rates – are the consequence of rational, welfare maximizing decisions by individu-
als and societies in countries whose underlying economic characteristics are themselves
different. Our hypothesis builds on the Aaron (1966) proposition that a society’s choice
between paygo and funded saving should depend on whether the natural rate of growth
is greater or less than the rate of return on capital – paygo being optimal in the first
case and funded saving in the second. Aaron’s criterion was a knife-edge criterion. We
suggest that, in the richer world of stochastic dynamics, it is optimal for societies to
choose to rely on both forms of provision (paygo and saving), and that it is the balance
of the two that is affected by economic conditions. Simply put, in countries in which
labor income is expected to grow slowly and to be subject to recurrent shocks, individ-
uals and society will, ceteris paribus, emphasize personal saving for the provision of
retirement income. In countries in which the real return to capital is expected to be low
and volatile, they will, on the contrary, put more weight on paygo transfers.
In order to test this approach, we construct a model of how societies and individuals
1In seeking exogenous explanations for different attitudes toward social policy in the United States and
Europe, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) point, among other factors, to the presence of racial tensions in the
United States. In their discussion of the divergent evolution of social security provisions in different coun-
tries, Bruno and Sachs (1985) emphasized the nature of union pressures.
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determine the levels of paygo and saving in the provision of retirement income. This
is a simple, two-period overlapping generations model in which a benevolent public
authority and a representative individual jointly choose that paygo tax rate and saving
rate which maximize the representative individual’s expected life-time utility. The next
step is to construct empirical estimates of the dynamic distributions of labor and capital
income in each country. Armed with these distributions, we use the model to generate
a cross section of predicted values of paygo and saving rates for each country in a
reference year, which we take to be 2002. The test of the validity of the model is how
well it explains actual, effective paygo commitments in that year.2 Though the model
describes the dynamic behavior of individuals and societies over time, what it explains
is differences in effective paygo contribution rates across countries at a given point in
time.
The biggest challenge in this exercise is data construction. In order to analyze
a society’s paygo and saving choices, we must first estimate the distribution of the
labor and capital income of a representative individual for sixty or more years – active
life plus retirement. Moreover, the variability and higher moments of this distribution
are decisively important for the computation of expected utility. In order to estimate
these, we would ideally like to have historical data on as many life-cycles as possible.
The available macroeconomic data, which only stretch back one hundred years, do not
provide direct evidence of more than two or three lifetimes.
To overcome this obstacle, we resort to a Monte-Carlo approach. Using data since
the end of World War II, we estimate simple models of the annual dynamics of labor
and capital income. We then use the parameters of these models, and bootstrapped
estimates of the distributions of their error terms, to simulate as many life-time histories
as we need. With these, we compute the expected life-time utility of the representative
2We chose 2002 as reference year because it is the first year when comparative and comprehensive data
on pension systems in the OECD became available (OECD (2003)). We would like also to test the ability
of the model to predict saving rates, but data on life-time saving rates, which are necessarily estimated by
cohort rather than by calendar year, exist in only a few countries.
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individual corresponding to any pair of paygo tax and saving rates. Our model says
that the rates that maximize this expected utility are the rates that society will choose.
We test the model on a subset of the countries of the OECD, focusing on high-
income countries which have developed financial markets, and which, though open to
trade, are not so small that trade dwarfs domestic production. Specifically, we chose
from the 23 developed countries in the OECD in 2003, the eight for which the average
value of the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP during the decade of the 1990s was
less than 55 percent.3
This paper builds on a long literature about the implications of risk and uncertainty
for the efficiency of paygo schemes. Merton (1983), Gordon and Varian (1988), Gale
(1990), Demange and Laroque (1999, 2000), Demange (2002) and others have shown
that a paygo system can enhance welfare in dynamically efficient economies because
of the unique opportunity it provides for workers to spread the risk of life-time earn-
ings over different generations. Gottardi and Kubler (2011) extend these analyses and
note that the result depends on the degree to which the paygo system reduces capital
accumulation. In de Menil, Murtin and Sheshinski (2005), we derived analytical re-
sults relating steady state optimal saving and paygo tax rates (when they exist and are
unique) to underlying fundamentals. The present paper uses the same model to obtain
empirical estimates of a cross section of economically rational tax and saving rates.
More recently, several papers have used models similar to ours to analyze the prop-
erties of public policies designed to provide intergenerational risk sharing. Bohn (2009)
posits a comprehensive, intergenerational welfare maximization framework, and con-
cludes that social security policies that shift risk from the working years to the the
years of retirement are preferable to policies that shift risk in the opposite direction.
Thogersen (1998) reaches a similar conclusion in an analysis which focuses on the
mean and variance of life-time income in both periods combined. Using a model also
3The countries we selected are Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom and
the United States. The average ratio of exports plus imports to GDP during the 1990s in these eight countries
ranges from 18 % in Japan to 53% in the United Kingdom.
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similar to the one used here, Wagener (2003) argues that this conclusion follows from
the use of an ex-ante utility criterion. He shows that the conclusion is reversed if the in-
come of the representative individual in her working years is taken as given, and utility
is maximised over expectations of retirement income. Beetsma and Bovenberg (2009)
extend this conclusion to economies in which there coexist both paygo and mandatory
funded pension systems. They argue that a fixed replacement rule in the funded pillar
provides risk sharing benefits which a defined contribution rule can not. Van Hem-
mert (2005) analyses state-contingent pension transfers. Gollier (2007) abstracts from
the uncertainty of labor income in order to focus on the volatility of the return to sav-
ing, and shows that pooled pension funds can of themselves provide intergenerational
insurance which the kind of individual saving behavior modeled here can not.
Simulation methods have been increasingly used to estimate the welfare effects
of either increasing or down-sizing a paygo system such as that of the United States.
Krueger and Kubler (2005) posit an economy populated with representative agents
living through a life-cycle of nine stages, who face macroeconomic shocks to labor
and capital income. They use Monte-Carlo techniques to compute the expected life-
time utility of each cohort of agents. Their focus is on the Pareto optimality of a single
experiment – the introduction of Social Security with a 2% tax rate in the United States
in 1935. In their most general cases, they conclude that the experiment was not Pareto
improving.
Nikishama and Smetters (2007) emphasize individual diversity (neglected in this
study and many of those cited). In their model of the U.S. economy, individuals have
different skill levels, and are subject to idiosyncratic shocks. Their model does not
allow for macroeconomic shocks to the wage rate and the return to capital. They find
that progressively reducing the U.S. paygo system to half the size it began with in 2003
would diminish welfare in the sense of Hicks, unless the down-sizing were accompa-
nied with labor tax reforms that compensated for the insurance against idiosyncratic
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risk provided by the original paygo system.
Fuster, I˙mrohorog˘lu and I˙mrohorog˘lu (2007) depart from the non-altruistic frame-
work adopted in much of this research, and posit individuals who incorporate the well
being of both children and parents in their own decision making. They simulate the
effect of a once-and-for-all elimination of Social Security on the welfare of dynasties
with different skill and demographic characteristics, and find a majority benefit from
the change. Their result depends critically on the elasticity of life-time labor supply to
the taxes required to finance Social Security.
Other authors - Dutta, Kappur and Orszag (2000) andMatsen and Thogersen (2004)
have used historically observed growth rates and rates of investment return to calculate
optimal paygo tax rates and saving rates for different developed countries. However,
our Monte-Carlo approach to estimating the relevant moments of these variables is
different from theirs. Dutta, Kappur and Orszag (DKO) and Matsen and Thogersen
(MT) take decades as representative of life histories.
DKO and MT’s “portfolio approach” further reduces the design of a social security
system to a decision regarding the optimal weights to be given, in a fixed portfolio of
social security assets, to investment in capital and investment in an asset whose rate of
return is equal to the growth of the wage bill. They deal only in rates of growth and thus
implicitly assume that the real wage bill follows a random walk with a drift. They do
not allow for the possibility that real wages may tend to regress to their long-term trend.
As MT themselves point out, in such a world, there is no way to insure against the risk
of a bad draw in the lottery for life-time labor income. Their approach thus assumes
away one of the principal early arguments in favor of paygo retirement schemes. Our
approach is to model the real wage bill as a process of stochastic deviations around
a deterministic growth path, and test for the stationarity of that process. When non-
stationarity is rejected, as it is in our estimates, paygo can provide intergenerational
insurance against the variability of real wage income. We calculate the amount of such
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insurance which would be optimal for each country.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 1 discusses the empirical evidence of
diversity in effective paygo provision in the OECD. Section 2 presents a model of how
societies and individuals determine paygo tax and saving rates. Section 3 presents our
data sources and estimates of the annual dynamics of average earnings and the average
return to saving made with macroeconomic data from 1950 through 2002. This sec-
tion includes a test of the stationarity of the wage process. Section 4 aggregates these
annual income components into summary measures of the labor and capital income of
the representative individual in the active and retirement years. Section 5 presents the
results. We derive the tax and saving rates which maximize the expected utility of the
representative individual in each country. We test the ability of these predicted rates
to explain the cross-country variation of the effective paygo tax rates in our sample.
Our principal result is that our preferred estimates explain 83% of this cross-country
variance. This section ends with an attempt to decompose the explained variance, and
attribute it to the principal sources of national difference. Section 6 addresses two hypo-
thetical questions: What would the effect on paygo tax rates be of a global convergence
of national capital markets? How would paygo tax rates have differed if individuals had
anticipated the possibility (but not predicted the occurence) of a crisis like that of 2008?
Section 7 concludes.
1 The Diversity of Effective Paygo Rates
Table 1 presents in country alphabetical order the effective paygo tax rates which
we seek to explain. A comment is in order about the nature of this variable and the way
it is measured. It is well known that social security budgets are often out of balance, that
paygo pensions are frequently partially financed out of general revenue, and that, as a
consequence, wage tax rates are a poor measure of the importance of a paygo system.
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The answer is to construct alternative, effective paygo tax rates. A country’s effective
rate measures what the wage tax would have to be for the revenue it generates to finance
the paygo disbursements to which that country is committed.4 It measures a country’s
forward commitment to paygo provision.
Let bw , be the average pension an employee is entitled to at retirement – relative to
the then average economy wide wage, and pe be the ratio of the number of pensioners
to the number of active employees at that time, then the effective tax rate required to
balance the system is
✓e =
b
w
p
e
. (1)
Appendix A discusses how we estimate bw , the “relative pension level”, and
p
e , the
number of retirees per employee, in order to construct effective paygo tax rates.
The salient characteristic of the distribution presented in Table 1 is its diversity.
The observations form three distinct clusters. Three countries – Australia, the United
Kingdom and the United States – have low effective tax rates. At the other end of the
spectrum are Italy and Spain – countries whose effective rates are more than double
those of the first group. And, in between, is the third cluster – Germany, Japan and
France – with effective rates roughly half way between the top group and the bottom
group. What explains this pattern? Cultural and historical differences? Or a shared
pattern of common response to differences in underlying economic conditions?
2 The Model
The central issue individuals and societies face in constructing a pension system is
how to allocate income between the active years and the retirement years. The stan-
dard, two-period, overlapping generations model describes the basic relationships. We
4See Disney (2004).
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assume that the representative individual saves only for her retirement consumption.5
Where we depart from the standard model, is that we treat the paygo tax rate as an en-
dogenous, collective decision. We posit the existence of a benevolent authority which
sets the tax rate. The representative individual and the tax authority are assumed both
to know the distributions of capital and labor income. Together, acting behind a “veil
of ignorance”, before lifetime income is known, they jointly choose the tax and saving
rates that maximize expected life-time utility. They assume that the economy is on the
steady state path towards which it is tending when their decision is made.6
Let !A be the labor income of the representative individual during her active years,
and !B her pro-rata share of the labor income of the individuals who are working
during her retirement years. Each individual provides for her retirement by contributing
a portion ✓ of her labor income during her active years to a balanced paygo system, and
by saving and investing an amount S .7 The budget constraint relating consumption
during the active and retirement years, cA and cB , to her labor income, her pension,
and her saving is:
cA = (1  ✓)!A   S (2)
cB = ✓!B +RS (3)
5We also assume that all individuals are identical, and thus neglect one of the important rationales for
social security – its potential effect on intragenerational redistribution. Our representative agent assumption
precludes, for instance, exploring the difference between Bismarkian and Beveridgean paygo systems. Dis-
ney and Whitehouse (1993) examine the effect of “opting out” in the U.K. on intragenerational distribution.
Pestieau (1999) examines the influence of different paygo formulae on distribution within each cohort. Our
representative agent assumption facilitates the analysis of cross-country heterogeneity.
6We model a decision making process of a consensual kind, in which societies and individuals base their
choices on the expected utility of a representative individual over her entire life-cycle. Galasso and Profeta
(2002, 2004) and others focus instead on conflicts between categories of the population, notably between
the young and the old. The dynamics in their models depend critically on the demographic structure of the
population.
7We assume that 0 < ✓ < 1, that liquidity and institutional constraints impose S > 0, and that ✓ and S
remain constant throughout the individual’s life. As van Hemert (2005) points out, state contingent decisions
would improve welfare. Though some governments have enacted state-contingent paygo mechanisms, these
are rare. A state contingent pago tax rate would attenuate the volatility of both paygo payments and paygo
benefits. To the extent that the volatility of labor income is an important empirical factor, it could enhance
the attractiveness of paygo provision.
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R is the gross return on the saving of the working years. The model assumes that the
individual plans to consume all her saving during retirement, and does not plan to leave
a bequest.
We emphasize the fact that labor income (!A and !B) and R are random variables.
The choice8 of any S and ✓ by the individual and society therefore entails evaluating
the risks associated with that choice. Let
V = E[u(cA)] +  E[u(cB)] (4)
be the ex-ante expected utility of the representative individual, where u(·) is the sepa-
rate utility function applicable to income in each phase of life and   is a discount factor
reflecting personal time preference. The tax authority and the individual jointly choose
✓ and S by maximizing V in (4) subject to (2) and (3). We refer to their choices as ✓⇤
and S⇤.
We leave the possible feedback from S to R and ! (through a closed economy
aggregate production function, for instance) out of the analysis. One way to interpret
this simplification is to argue that free trade determines factor prices up to structural
and institutional country-specific effects.9
8The two-period structure of the model abstracts from much of the complexity of an optimal consumption
path. In a dynamic program, the representative agent would choose different levels of saving in each period
within her working-age and retirement phases. It is difficult to conjecture how the results would differ within
a dynamic setup, as many other factors may intervene. Moreover, the outcome of a dynamic program would
not consist of a single saving rate, but of a set of age-specific saving rates. A plausible hypothesis would be
that the representative agent would favor high-return, high-risk investments at the beginning of her active life
(i.e. higher saving), and conversely, lower-return and lower-risk forms of income subsequently (i.e. lower
saving). We see no reason to expect that the average saving rate over her life-time would differ systematically
from the one we derive in our simplified model.
9We assume that differences in product mix, skill composition and financial institutions cause long-run
differences in factor price trends. The important simplifying assumption is that these country-specific effects
are not affected by domestic capital accumulation.
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3 The Diversity of National Characteristics
The challenge in applying the theory of the preceding section is an empirical one.
We seek, for each of the eight countries in our sample, to construct a representation
of the life time distribution of labor and capital earnings, derived from information
available to the actors at the time they make their decisions. Because our objective is to
explain cross-country differences in paygo rates, we derive these distributions, as much
as possible, from specifically national data.
We use national dependency rates, national survival functions, national unemploy-
ment rates, national growth rates of labor income, national capital market returns, and
national measures of the variability of the latter two.
3.1 Data
We posit that for public and private agents setting paygo rates at the beginning of
the 21st Century, the relevant history is post-War history. Too much structural change
separates the post-War from the pre-War. We also posit that these agents use as much
information about the period as possible to extrapolate the future. Our earliest data
point is 1950.
We identify the annual return to saving in each country with the total real return
on stocks, as measured by the broadest stock index incorporating dividends available
in each country, which we obtain from Global Financial Data. Monthly stock indices
are averaged to obtain an annual index. Real total annual returns, rt, are calculated
by using the national CPI from IMF (2004) to deflate nominal returns.10 Section 3.2
explains how we use this data, from 1950 to 2002, to estimate country-specific, average
real rates of return to saving, and to obtain country-specific measures of its variability.
10We have experimented with using a measure of the return to saving which incorporates returns to bonds
as well as to equities. However, the only bond return data we were able to find on a comparable basis for our
eight countries was data on the return to government bonds. These are an inadequate measure of the return
to corporate bonds. We do not obtain satisfactory results with mixed portofolios of stocks and government
bonds.
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Paradoxically, data on labor income is not as widely available in our eight countries
as data on capital income. The model calls for a measure of average, annual earnings.
But comparable date on economy-wide average earnings are only available since 1955
for three of our countries, and since 1960 or up to 1970 for the others. If we were
to choose those later starting dates to estimate income expectations, we would lose
up to 20 important years of data, and would be limited to a truncated view of income
dynamics in each country. Therefore, our preference is to use real annual GDP as a
proxy for labor income. GDP data is available from 1950 in all of our eight countries.
We let real average annual labor income per employee be wt = yt/et, where yt is real
annual GDP and et is total employees.11 Average annual labor income per member of
the labor force is yt/lt = (1   ut)wt, where lt is the total labor force and ut is the
unemployment rate.
We subject the model and the results to a thorough sensitivity analysis by
reestimating the relevant distributions with the available data on labor earnings.12 We
report in Appendix C that when the models are estimated on identical but shorter sam-
ple periods, the GDP based estimations and the wage based estimations both support
the central hypothesis, and are each similar to the other. But when GDP data going
back to 1950 is used, the explanatory power of the model increases.
Both the earnings based models and the GDP based models provide country-specific
estimates of the trend rate of growth of real labor earnings per employee, and country-
specific measures of their variability. Functional forms are discussed in Section 3.2. Data
on national unemployment rates is taken from OECD (2016).
Rational paygo decisions also depend on projected dependency rates, which vary
11We obtain real GDP and total employees data from OECD (2005). We extend both series back to 1950
using historical data from Mitchell (2003, 2005). Dutta et al. (2000), Matsen and Thogersen (2004) and
others also use GDP as a proxy for labor income.
12For seven of the countries in the sample, we take total annual labor earnings and total employment
from OECD (2016). In the case of the U.K., we are able to extend the length of the sample by using the
employment series in Bank of England (2016). Total annual earnings include both overtime and part-time
earnings. Initial dates are 1955 for France, the United Kingdom and the United States; 1960 for Italy and
Japan; 1961 for Spain; 1964 for Australia; and 1970 for Germany. Annual nominal earnings are deflated by
the CPI series in IMF (2004).
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significantly from country to country as a function of demographic trends, trends in
labor participation, and country-specific institutional arrangements.13 We also use
country-specific life-tables, taken from United Nations (2015), to derive the national
survival functions which condition the estimation of life-time expected utility by the
representative individuals in each country (See Eq. 17).
There is one important parameter for which we do not have national data, namely
the relative rate of risk aversion (RRA). Our strategy is to seek to explain national
differences in paygo rates without appealing to differences in tastes. The question
nonetheless remains: at what value should we fix the common relative rate of risk
aversion (assumed to be constant) in our estimations of national expected utility?14
A value of 5 is frequently used in empirical macroeconomic work. The length of
the planning horizon in pension decisions suggests, however, that a higher rate of risk
aversion should apply in this case.15
We report results with values ofRRA ranging from 5 to 20, but our preferred value
is 12. This is half way between the Beetsma and Schotman (2001) survey result of 6
and the value of 18 used by Krueger and Kubler (2005) in their study of U.S. social
security.
13We calculate expected national dependency rates from OECD (2016) demographic and labor force par-
ticipation data for the periods 2042-2062. See Appendix A. We treat d as non-random, but, as a referee
has pointed out, projections of its future level are, in fact, very uncertain. Estimating a different probability
distribution of d for each country would be challenging, but would constitute a useful variant of our model.
14In a study based on portfolio allocation evidence, Friend and Blume (1975) infer values of RRA be-
tween 2 and 3. Eisenhauer and Ventura (2003) and Guiso and Paiella (2008), analyzing individual responses
to a lottery proposed by the Bank of Italy, report relative rates of risk aversion between 4.5 and 14. Beetsma
and Schotman (2001) derive estimates in the neighborhood of 6 from responses to a popular Dutch television
quiz program. Campbell (2003) uses national financial data similar to ours to estimate consumption-based
asset pricing models, and finds implied values of RRA between 50 and 600 for several of the countries in
our sample.
15In empirical studies, the commonly adopted value of the relative risk aversion parameter is based on
Arrow’s derivation of the certainty equivalent premium paid for a fair lottery with small positive and negative
(equal) payoffs (the premium is equal to half the risk aversion parameter times the squared payoff). When a
lottery is played n times it can be shown that the premium is approximately n times its value in the one-shot
lottery. In our context, the working lifetime phase stretches over many years. An investment with uncertain
returns kept for many years is like a lottery with a positive drift (otherwise a risk-averse individual would
not invest in such a lottery) played many times. Risk increases in proportion to the number of years. In this
context, it is reasonable to adopt a significantly larger risk aversion parameter compared to one used for a
one-time investment.
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3.2 Annual Dynamics
We model average annual earnings per employee wt as varying around a growth path
which converges to a country-specific, long-run trend. Differences in these trend growth
rates are in principle one of the differences conditioning the relative desirability of
paygo and funded saving across countries. In order to estimate these trends, and the
variability of earnings around them, without bias and efficiently, we must take account
of a possible phenomenon of convergence. We allow for this possibility by including
slow-down effects represented by the function f(t) in our equation for the real wage:
lnwt = a+ gt+ f(t) + xt (5)
lim
t!1 f(t) = 0
where g is the rate of growth on the long-term exponential growth path toward which
wt converges, w1 = 1, and xt is the innovation on annual wages.16 Though different
specifications of the function f were tested, the simple exponential form µe⇢t was
selected for all countries.
We assume that, when predicting her life-time earnings, the representative agent
takes average unemployment experience into account, and projects the average annual
earnings of persons in the labor force17, yt/lt = (1   ut)wt. We therefore complete
our annual model with the simplest possible representation of the unemployment rate,
ut, which we model as the sum of a constant mean u and an innovation ⇣t.
ut = u + ⇣t (6)
16Setting w1 = 1 at the beginning of the active life of each cohort ensures that every cohort in every
country, no matter when it is born, views and analyzes its life-time prospects in the same way as every other.
17This is equivalent to assuming that the earnings of the employed are shared mutually with the un-
employed. Empirical tests of an earlier version of our model, which incorporated the volatility potentially
introduced by the random nature of individual unemployment experience, concluded that random individual
unemployment experience does not have a significant effect on paygo decisions. This version abstracts from
that potential volatility.
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We represent the log-returns to equity simply as the sum of a constant mean return
r¯ and an innovation ✏t.18
ln(1 + rt) = r¯ + ✏t (7)
Though we treat the long-term trend of wages and the long term return on invest-
ment as independent of one another, we allow for cyclical interaction between the de-
viations from long-term values of both factor incomes. We model this interaction with
an estimated vector auto-correlation of errors from each income generating process.
The wage income process and the variability of investment returns in “normal” times
are estimated with data from 1950 through 2002 (we discuss the implications of low
probability crises like that of 2008 in Appendix D).
Table 2 and the first four columns of Table 3 describe the results we obtain when
we estimate equations (5) and (7). Table 2 shows that, with the non-linear trend spec-
ification just mentioned, residuals xt pass stationarity tests for all countries at a 5%
confidence level and for most countries at a 1% confidence level. This implies, as we
emphasized in the introduction, that a paygo system is capable of providing intergen-
erational insurance against the variability of real wages.
Table 3 shows that country-to-country differences in the mean and variability of
real investment returns dwarf differences in the growth and variability of wages. The
contrast between Italy – where the real return to investment averages 4.1% and has a
coefficient of variation of 6.0 – and the United States – where it averages 7.5% and
has a coefficient of variation of 1.8 – is striking. The coefficient of variation for Spain
resembles that of Italy. The coefficient of variation for the United Kingdom resembles
that of the United States. The other countries lie in between.
Our discussion so far has not yet taken account of serial and cross correlations in
the dynamics of wage and investment returns. We estimate a first-order VAR process
18In the equation which follows, we define r as the expectation of ln(1 + rt).
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to model the dynamic interaction between xt and ✏t. Specifically, we suppose that0B@ xt
✏t
1CA =
264 ⇢xtxt 1 ⇢xt✏t 1
⇢✏txt 1 ⇢✏t✏t 1
375
0B@ xt 1
✏t 1
1CA+
0B@ ⌘t
vt
1CA (8)
where ⌘t and vt are two white noises. Results are presented in columns 5-8 of Table 3.
We find a significant degree of serial correlation of wage innovations - which is consis-
tent with the existence of a business cycle - in all countries (between 0.58 in Spain and
0.85 in the United States). We also find moderate but significant serial correlation of
investment returns in four countries with volatile stock markets (Germany, Italy, Japan
and Spain). The United States exhibits a significant negative correlation between wage
innovations in one year and real stock market returns in the following year. We inter-
pret this lagged, negative feedback as reflecting the dynamics of profit margins over
the business cycle.19
If annual capital returns are serially uncorrelated, the variability of their sum bene-
fits from the Law of Large numbers. Positive serial correlation will, on the other hand,
amplify the variability of the sum.
4 Life-time income dynamics
The purpose of this section is to show how the annual income histories which we sim-
ulate below can be condensed into summary measures of income in the active and
retirement years.
19Investigating this dynamic further would take us far afield from the focus of our study. Suffice it to say
that other scholars analyzing comparable databases have found a similar negative, delayed cross correlation.
See Bottazi et al. (1996) in their macroeconomic study of international portfolio decisions.
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4.1 Average wage income
Redefine !A as the average wage income of the representative individual in a specific
life history or trajectory. In a similar manner, redefine !B as her share of the wages on
the same trajectory of the individuals who will be working when she is retired. Though
!A and !B are given for any specified trajectory, ex-ante, before a specific trajectory
has been drawn, they are random variables.
For the moment, assume that the maximum length of a working period is T years
and the maximum length of retirement is also T (we will introduce survival probabili-
ties later). Then20 :
!A =
TX
t=1
(1  ut)wt
T
(9)
Let pt be the number of retired persons, and recall that yt represents the wage bill.
Then:
!B =
2TX
t=T+1
yt/pt
T
(10)
Noting that one can decompose
yt
pt
=
yt
et
et
lt
lt
pt
(11)
where et is total employment, lt the labor force, wt = yt/et is average annual earnings
per employee, et/lt = 1  ut, and lt/pt = 1/dt, with dt the dependency ratio (or ratio
of retirees to the active labor force), one can rewrite (11) as
!B =
2TX
t=T+1
(1  ut)wt/dt
T
(12)
The dependency ratio, dt, differs from country to country because of differences in the
20In the following expression, wt stands for the real wage of the representative individual in the t-th year
of her active life. We assume (for lack of better information) that this wage does not depend on seniority,
and, therefore, that the representative individual earns the economy-wide average wage rate every year.
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growth rate of the population and differences (due to custom, fertility and mortality)
in the ratio of retirement years to active years. On any given historical trajectory, dt
varies as demographic patterns change. But, on a steady state path, dt is necessarily
constant.21
4.2 Average investment income
Consider now the computation of the average, life-time return to saving. We assume,
for simplicity, that the purpose of saving is exclusively to provide income during re-
tirement, and we focus on the rate at which annual saving can be transformed into a
retirement annuity. If the representative individual saves S every year of her active life,
she will have accumulated
F = S
TX
t=1
TY
⌧=t
(1 + r⌧ ) (13)
by the time she retires.22 That sum will purchase an annuity A, which we assume
satisfies the following “fair value” constraint:
F = A
2TX
t=T+1
 tQt
⌧=T+1(1 + r⌧ )
(14)
with  t being the representative individual’s probability of survival to age t.
21The dependency rates used in our simulations are computed from OECD demographic and labor force
participation data for the periods 2042-2062. The projected averages for this period are: Australia – 0.27;
France – 0.35; Germany – 0.45; Italy – 0.47; Japan – 0.39; Spain – 0.44; U.K. – 0.29; and U.S.A. – 0.24. See
Appendix A.
22We focus on her potential saving, conditional on survival. We account for the probability of survival
below.
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We can write the resulting annuity as23
A =
 PT
t=1
QT
⌧=t(1 + r⌧ )P2T
t=T+1
 tQt
⌧=T+1(1+r⌧ )
 
S (15)
or
A = RS (16)
with R equal to the expression in brackets in (15). Note that R measures both accumu-
lation and annuitization. It is, as before, a random variable.
4.3 Expected utility
With these empirical definitions of !A, !B and R, the budget constraints 2 and 3 can
be interpreted as depicting the relationship between average consumption during the
representative individual’s active years and average consumption during her retirement
years. Our central hypothesis is that, in each country, the representative individual and
the tax authority jointly choose the paygo tax rate and the saving rate, ✓⇤ and S⇤, which
maximize the representative individual’s ex-ante, expected life-time utility.
In calculating this expected utility, the individual and the tax authority take account
of the fact that the individual will enjoy it conditional on her continuing to be alive24,
and that a positive rate of time preference,  , leads her to discount more distant in-
stantaneous utilities more heavily. The probability of survival,  t, and the rate of time
preference will affect the weight attributed to more distant utilities in the same manner.
23In writing (15) and (16), we do not mean to imply that actuarial markets are broadly prevalent or widely
used in our eight OECD countries. We simply assume that, when projecting her retirement income, the
representative agent takes account of the fact that her retirement fund will continue to grow, conditional on
her survival, after she stops contributing to it. This also allows us to assume that total accidental bequests are
zero.
24We take the probability of survival as exogenously given. Pestieau, Ponthiere and Sato (2008) argue that
survival rates are a function of spending on health, which in turn depends on pension provisions.
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The planner’s maximand can therefore be written:25
V = E
"
TX
t=1
 t
(1 +  )t
u(cA) +
2TX
t=T+1
 t
(1 +  )t
u(cB)
#
(17)
We assume that u(c) is characterised by a constant relative risk aversion (RRA).26 ✓⇤
and S⇤ are the values which maximize V in (17).
5 Results
We now use equations (4), (5), (7) and (8) to simulate many life histories of wt, rt
and ut (we chose to generate 1000). For each history, we draw values at random from
empirical distributions of ⌘t, vt, and the unemployment innovations ⇣t27 constructed
by boot-strapping our estimates of these error terms.
We then proceed to compute ✓⇤ and S⇤, using the algorithm described in Ap-
pendix B. We focus on our model predictions of ✓⇤. Appendix B presents a full
table of values of ✓⇤ and S⇤ based on a range of different assumptions regarding
RRA.
Table 4 presents the values of ✓⇤ which we obtain from these simulations when
RRA = 12 and RRA = 5, and compares them with the values of effective tax rates, ✓e,
reported in Table 1. We discuss both results in the next section.
25In order to remain within the framework of a two-period model, we have to make the simplifying as-
sumption that income and consumption in the active years and income and consumption in the retirement
years are equal every year to their respective average values.
26T is the maximum length of the representative agent’s active years and retirement years. We lack the
institutional, national information which would allow us to attribute a different value for this parameter to
each country. Realized, average terms depend on the survival function. The assumption we apply to all
countries is that T = 40. We also assume   = .02. We have tested that results are not sensitive to these
assumptions.
27Unemployment innovations ⇣t are the difference between the unemployment rate ut and its mean (eq.
6). We restrict the estimation of the empirical distribution of unemployment innovations to the period 1980-
2002 to avoid difficulties associated with the secular increase in unemployment rates in Europe after the first
oil shock.
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5.1 Testing the Model
The test of our rational, economic model is the degree to which ✓⇤ predicts actual
values of ✓e in a cross-section regression,
✓ek = ✓
⇤
k + "k, (18)
where k is a country index. We use two different sets of estimates of ✓⇤ to test the
hypothesis. The set to which we devote our main focus is the one in which GDP is
a proxy for labor earnings, and samples in all countries begin in 1950. In the other,
we use actual, annual data for labor earnings, and are, therefore, confined to sample
periods which begin variously in 1955, 1960, 1961, 1964 and 1970. In both cases,
we test the hypothesis twice, once under the assumption that RRA = 12, and once
under the assumption RRA = 5. The GDP based results are presented in this section.
Appendix C presents the earnings based results and compares themwith the GDP based
results. In all cases, the test supports our central hypothesis, but the support is strongest
with the GDP based data and longer sample periods.
In Figure 1, we plot the GDP-based predicted rational rates based on RRA = 12,
✓⇤, on the horizontal axis and the effective rates, ✓e, on the vertical axis. There is
clearly a strong relationship between the variables. R
2
of the linear regression drawn
in the Figure is 83%. This result confirms our basic hypothesis that objective, economic
differences explain the diverse pattern of effective paygo tax rates in our sample.
However, the regression implies that actual rates are too sensitive to predicted rates.
The estimated slope, 3.7, far exceeds the theoretical value of 1.0 in equation (18). We
conjecture that omitted variables cause the underlying relationship to be non-linear.
The argument is that high paygo rates and low saving rates are correlated with weak
regulatory infrastructure – poor policing of insider trading, inadequate protection of
minority stockholder rights, etc. When capital markets provide low and variable re-
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turns, these institutional weaknesses also tend to be present, and to cause reliance on
paygo provision to be even higher than it otherwise would be.
We therefore estimate the following Poisson relationship:
✓ek = exp(a+ b✓
⇤
k) + "k (19)
Predicted and actual values are plotted in Figure 2. In the Poisson model, the
estimated slope is 1.0 when ✓⇤k is low, and increases as it rises.
28 The Poisson model is
our preferred model.29
5.2 Decomposition of Explained Variance
Though we have only one explanatory variable in our model, it is constructed as a
composite of many elements. We now ask how much each element contributes to the
explanatory power of the model. To that purpose, we run a number of counter-factual
simulations in which we remove these elements, one at a time, and evaluate the result-
ing reduction in explained variance. At each stage, the way we remove the particular
element’s contribution to explained variance is by attributing its value in one country
to all of the countries. For instance, we consider what happens to the model’s ability to
explain cross-country variation, when we attribute U.S. capital market characteristics –
or French labor market characteristics – to each of the other seven countries. We take
the reduction in explained cross-country variance of each counter-factual simulation to
be a heuristic measure of the contribution of the removed element to total explained
variance.30 The results are presented in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 analyzes the results of
standardizing capital market characteristics, and Table 6 of standardizing labor market
28In the Poisson model, the slope is 1.0 at ✓⇤k = 7, and 2.7 at ✓
⇤
k = 12.
29Although the F-test of the linear model and the Chi-square test of the Poisson model are not strictly
comparable, a RMSE corrected for degrees of freedom, computed for the Poisson case (4.2), is smaller than
the RMSE of the linear estimate (5.0).
30The highly non-linear character of the model means that we can not attribute particular significance to
combinations of these individual measures.
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characteristics.31
The Tables elicit three general observations, which can be made before we examine
the details:
• Understanding the stochastic structure of the environment in which individuals
and societies plan for retirement is critical to understanding those decisions. The
stochastic nature of our model is not just a refinement; it is its central feature.
• Differences in capital market characteristics account for more of the cross-country
variance of paygo levels than any other factor (with the projected dependency
rate being a close second). The reason is clear. The volatility of capital market
shocks is, in general, two orders of magnitude greater than that of labor market
shocks, and it varies dramatically from country to country. The striking feature
of this result is that it is very different from what the early theorists of paygo
systems expected. They focussed on the volatility of labor earnings. One of their
central points was that a paygo system may be pareto improving, even when the
economy is dynamically efficient, because it allows agents to insure against the
volatility of labor earnings.
• The magnitude of the effects of different national characteristics depends impor-
tantly on what we assume the relative rate of risk aversion to be. This observation
follows naturally from the first, above. If stochastic structure is important, then
the lens through which individuals evaluate stochastic events – their utility func-
tion – is central.
Table 5 analyzes the contribution of capital markets to paygo differences. If we
focus on the left half of the table, where RRA = 12, we see that the volatility of cap-
31In both Tables 5 and 6, we have set the cross-VAR coefficients of Eq. (8) equal to zero before simulating
rational paygo rates. We do this because our purpose is to identify separately the effects of capital market
innovations and labor market innovations. Non-zero cross-effects would cause them to be comingled in
ways that vary from country to country. As it turns out, the estimates used as a base of comparison in these
tables are similar to the “rational paygo rates” presented in Table 4. Eliminating cross effects has only a
marginal impact on every country except the United States. For consistency, we use these estimates with no
cross-effects also to simulate standardizing the dependency rate, d.
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ital market shocks accounts for about a quarter of the explained variance.32 Volatility
proves to be more important than differences in mean expected return. Fixing that ev-
erywhere at its U.S. value reduces explained variance by only 4%. We conjecture that
what lies behind this result is a) the striking extent of the differences in the variabil-
ity of capital returns from country to country, and b) the sensitivity of expected utility
to this variability.
If we turn to the right side of Table 5, where RRA = 5, we see that the explanatory
importance of capital market variability appears even greater there. In that case, dif-
ferences in the volatility of returns account for 70% of the explained variance, whereas
differences in mean expected return account for barely 1% of explained variance.33
What is perhaps even more striking is the magnitude of the shift away from paygo trig-
gered by improvements in capital market volatility. Whether RRA = 12 or 5, the pref-
erence of all countries for saving increases when capital market volatility decreases.
But the drop in ✓⇤ associated with lower volatility is much larger when RRA = 5.34
Table 6 analyzes the contribution to paygo differences of factors which affect
implicit paygo returns. The first thing one notices is the insignificance of the variabil-
ity of labor earnings, whether RRA = 12 or 5. When we attribute the relatively low
volatility of these earnings in France to the other countries, explained variance is ef-
fectively unchanged, which implies that this factor is not a significant contributor to
cross-country variance. Similarly, when we attribute the French trend rate of growth of
labor income, g, to other countries, explained variance is again effectively unchanged
(This result is not shown in the table.) Admittedly, our prior for that simulation was
ambiguous, because the multiplicative nature of the wage rate error term (see Eq. 5)
32In column 3, the reduction in explained variance when this volatility is set everywhere equal to U.S.
values, is 22%, which is about a quarter of the total explained variance, 85%.
33Part but not all of the striking drop in variance explained is a reflection of the sharp drop in the rational
rates of Germany and Japan. The same calculations excluding Germany and Japan attribute almost 50% of
the variance explained to the remaining capital shocks.
34Lower volatility causes the average rational paygo rate to drop from 9.1 to 4.7 whenRRA = 5 (Compare
col. 6 with col. 5). The drop is more moderate, from 12.6 to 10.5, if RRA =12 (Compare col. 3 with col.
2).
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implies that increasing g, and thus raising the implicit return of paygo, also increases
the amplitude of wage shocks, and raises the volatility of that return.
The dominant influence on the labor income side is that of the dependency rate, d,
which agents expect will prevail when the current generation retires. This parame-
ter, which we treat as non-random, figures directly and importantly in calculations of
the implicit return of paygo. Table 6 shows that its marginal contribution is 29% of
explained variance whenRRA = 12, and 11% of explained variance whenRRA = 5.35
What is particularly striking about the dependency rate is the direction of its effect
on rational paygo rates. Reducing d appears to have both an income and a substitution
effect. When the substitution effect dominates, an increase in expected d creates an
incentive for society to lower ✓⇤. Agents expect a larger number of claimants for future
pensions, and, therefore, other things being equal, reduced pensions. When the income
effect dominates, increasing d – though it reduces the expected return of paygo for
the representative individual – causes ✓⇤ to rise. In Table 6, when risk aversion is high
and RRA = 12, the income effect dominates in every country. When RRA = 5, the
substitution effect dominates in Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S., and the
income effect continues to prevail, but more moderately, in the remaining countries.
Higher risk aversion appears to cause individuals and society to protect the rela-
tive stability of retirement income that paygo provides. The return to saving is highly
volatile in all countries, much more so in some than in others. Paygo provides a less
volatile alternative. Thus, when individuals are very risk averse, a drop in the implicit
return of paygo causes them to want more of it.
Which value of RRA best describes sensitivity to risk in the developed countries
in our sample? The argument in Section 3.1 that the length of the planning horizon
implies greater sensitivity to risk, weighs in favor of higher values of RRA.Moreover,
the evidence in Appendix C is that higher values of RRA, specifically RRA = 12,
35We find, in simulations not reported here, that standardizing the survival functions has only a minor
effect on rational paygo rates. Differences in life expectancy per se appear to have less effect on pension
decisions than fertility and the many institutional and other factors affecting dependency.
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contribute to a more powerful explanation of the cross-country variation of effective
rates. In our judgment, we understand the logic of pension planning in our countries
better, if we attribute high relative rates of risk aversion to them. When RRA is on
the high end of the acceptable range, we can more clearly identify the pension implica-
tions of the factor which most differentiates one developed country from another – the
stochastic characteristics of its capital markets. The fact that high values imply under
certain circumstances a desire to defend the stability of paygo in spite of its declining
internal return does not alter our judgment.
6 Further Results
In this section, we use the rational, economic model (maintaining RRA = 12), to con-
sider alternative economic scenarios. We ask how paygo rates may be influenced by
the integration of national capital markets, and by a new awareness of the low but
significant probability of crises like that of 2008. In each case, we modify the rele-
vant assumptions, rerun the algorithm described in Appendix B, and compare the new
predictions with our previous “normal” rates.
6.1 The integration of financial markets
If the capital markets of the large OECD countries were to become fully integrated,
what would the consequences be for national patterns of paygo tax rates?
We address the issue by performing the following thought experiment. Suppose
that our eight countries continue to have distinct and separate labor markets, but that
they share a common, pooled capital market. Assume further, for simplicity, that the
stochastic characteristics of the return to investment in that pooled capital market are
the same as those we have observed for the United States. The simulations presented
in Table 5 closely approximate this scenario. In Table 7, col. 3, we go one step fur-
ther, and completely replace each country’s own distribution of capital returns and its
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own VAR coefficient measuring the serial correlation of investment returns (⇢✏t✏t 1 in
equation (8)) with that of the United States.36 Not surprisingly, the pattern of retire-
ment provision converges in the eight countries. The cross-country standard deviation
of the predicted rational rates goes down from 2.8 in the standard set of results (where
VAR cross-effects are muted) to 0.5 in the integration experiment results. Access to the
relative stability of a global capital market would bring about declines in paygo rates
which vary commensurately with the previous volatility of national capital markets.
A completely different exercise involves assuming that the representative agent
eliminates financial markets completely from her retirement planning. We do this in
Table 7, col. 4, by imposing the constraint S = 0 in all countries. This thought exper-
iment leaves all the other cross-country differences (dependency, wage distributions,
long-term wage growth trend) full room to play out. Deprived of saving, agents choose
higher paygo rates in all countries. The exercise shows how much capital markets (in
this case their absence) influence desired paygo rates.37
6.2 Global Crises
We have assumed that in 2002 individuals and the pension authority did not allow for
the possibility of crises like that which unfolded in 2008. If they had, would they have
made the pension commitments implicit in the predictions of section 5? Clearly, the
realization of such a possibility would have reduced expectations of life-time utility.
But, even though faced with a more somber future, each society would still have had
to choose the best possible balance between paygo and saving. Would awareness of
36The radical nature of this hypothetical exercise should be emphasized. It abstracts from all of the insti-
tutional differences that characterized OECD capital markets in the second half of the twentieth Century. It
also assumes away national heterogeneity of capital. For the real rate of return to be identical across coun-
tries, they would all have to share a common capital market. In addition, those which had common currencies
or were linked by fixed exchange rates would have to share a common inflation rate. Currency depreciation
would have to exactly compensate for inflation differences between countries with floating rates.
37This exercise was suggested by an anonymous referee. There is some convergence of paygo rates, but it
is not as stark as in the integration of financial markets case. The coefficient of variation (last row in Table
7) drops by 76% in the integration of financial markets exercise (compare col. 3 to col. 2) and by 40% when
the representative agent forgoes any access to capital markets (compare col. 4 to col. 2).
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the possibility of a crisis have affected those calculations? Our analysis in Appendix D
suggests that paygo rates would not have been fundamentally altered.
7 Conclusion
The central result of this paper is that a rational economic, and consensual model of
how societies set paygo tax rates replicates the diverse pattern of effective paygo rates
in large OECD countries at the beginning of the 21st Century. The model is a sim-
ple, two-period OLG model, in which a representative individual and a benevolent tax
authority jointly choose the tax rate and the saving rate which maximize the expected
life-time utility of the representative individual. We assume that the individual and the
tax authority both have complete knowledge of the distribution of labor and capital in-
come over the individual’s lifetime. We construct this distribution by estimating annual
equations for the wage rate and the return to capital, and using them to simulate large
numbers of life histories. Taking expectations over these life histories, we compute the
expected life-time utility of the representative individual as a function of the paygo tax
and saving rates. The model predicts that society will choose the tax and saving rate
which maximize the individual’s expected life-time utility. Though the model assumes
that every agent expects the paygo budget to be balanced over her lifetime, its focus is
more on pension provision than pension financing.
We find that societies in which capital markets are relatively stable, and offer rates
of return well in excess of the rate of growth of labor income, tend to have mod-
erate paygo tax rates. By contrast, societies in which capital markets are relatively
volatile, choose higher paygo tax rates. These considerations – the most important of
which are differences in the volatility of the return to capital – explain approximately
83% of the cross-section variance of observed effective paygo tax rates in 2002. The
results point to the importance for pensions of reducing capital market volatility. Al-
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lowing for the possibility of extreme events, like those of 2008, does not change our
conclusions. Among the many questions calling for future research, one of the central
ones has to do with the effect of the distributional characteristics of paygo systems in a
heterogeneous population. Addressing such questions will require the use of substan-
tially more disaggregated models.
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A Constructing Estimates of Effective Paygo Tax Rates
in 2002
Following Disney (2004), we write the effective tax rate as
✓e =
b
w
p
e
. (A-1)
Of the two parameters on the right hand side, the more difficult to estimate
is bw , “the relative pension level”, because it depends on numerous, detailed, country-
specific regulations. We use estimates of this parameter first published in 2003 in a new
OECD publication, Pensions at a Glance. Noting that laws in effect at a given moment
generally entail future commitments to increases or reductions of benefits spread out
over many years, the OECD computes, on the basis of legislation in effect in 2002, the
average pension which an employee who entered the labor force that year, and subse-
quently fulfilled all relevant working requirements, would be entitled to at the statutory
retirement age. To the extent that a social security system is contributory, different
individuals (all of whom have met all the work requirements) will receive different
pensions, because of differences in their life-time earnings. The OECD therefore bases
its projection of pension entitlements on what it projects the range of life-term earnings
to be. It then averages these entitlements, and presents this average “relative pension
level” as a percentage of its projection of the economy wide average wage during the
years when the individual in question will be in retirement.
The forward looking nature of the OECD measure of the relative pension level, bw ,
requires for consistency that our measure of pe also be forward looking. It should reflect
the balance between retirees and workers for the duration of the retirement of the cohort
whose entitlements we are estimating. We base our estimate of pe in each country on
OECD projections of the number of retirees and the number of active employees in
each country between 2042 and 2062.
We adjust for the statutory nature of the OECD’s measure of relative pension lev-
els by recognizing that many individuals who are working at the time they retire will
nonetheless not receive a full, potential pension, because they have incurred spells of
maternity leave, unemployment, or other interruptions from active work. We estimate
that the average, normal pension is 20 % lower than the potential level calculated by
the OECD.38 As in Disney (2004), we further argue that persons who were not em-
38OECD (2003) presents projected pension levels for men and not for women. Though, in all the countries
in our sample, statutory pension provisions are the same for women as for men, the actual pensions women
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ployed during the last decade of their working lives receive half of a normal pension,
this additional discount corresponding to average widow and survivor provisions.
The effective tax rates thus obtained are not current tax rates. They reflect the
future commitments that legislation currently in effect implies for the cohort entering
employment, and measure the burden of those commitments on those who will be
employed during this cohort’s retirement. Their forward looking nature corresponds
to the forward looking nature of the collective decision process hypothesized in our
model.
B Simulation Algorithm
We construct measures of the rational, economic paygo tax rates which our model
predicts by using the annual equations for labor and capital income estimated in section
3 to simulate numerous life cycle histories. The algorithm has seven steps:
1. To simulate each life cycle j, we draw a full history, 0 < t < 2T , from the
empirical distributions of b⌘t, vˆt and b⇣t . We use the first two to construct a
sample of innovations
⇣
x(j)t , ✏
(j)
t
⌘
2T t 0
using the vector auto-regression (8).
2. Capital returns are simply deduced from (7), whereas annual wages in the steady-
state regime are given by
lnw(j)t = aˆ+ gˆt+ x
(j)
t (20)
The convergence of earnings is assumed completed.
3. Using (9) and (12), we compute !(j)A ,!
(j)
B . We use (15) and (16) to compute
R(j).
4. We select values of the saving and tax rates (✓, S), and compute c(j)A , c
(j)
B and the
lifetime utility associated with that history and those values of (✓, S),
PT
t=1
 t
(1+ )tu(c
j
A)+P2T
t=T+1
 t
(1+ )tu(c
j
B).
5. We go to step 1 and loop 1000 times.
6. We compute expected utility V for each pair (✓, S), using (17).
receive are lower than those received by men, because their annual earnings are lower. Much of our discount
corresponds to the lower average career earnings of women.
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7. We scan over the space 0 < ✓, S < 1, allowing each variable to increase in
steps of 0.001. The values ✓⇤ and S⇤which maximize V are the values which the
model predicts that society and the individual will adopt.39
The values of S⇤ and ✓⇤ depends onRRA. Table B1 displays the values obtained when
RRA varies between 5 and 20. As RRA rises and societies become more risk averse,
they increasingly avoid the volatility of capital markets, and rely more on paygo. ✓⇤
rises, and S⇤ falls.
C Estimations Using Data on Average Annual Earn-
ings.
In sections 3 through 6, we construct measures of rational paygo rates using GDP as
a proxy for earnings. This makes it possible to start our estimates of the underlying
annual models in 1950, prior to the availability of comparable earnings series. In this
appendix, we compare the results above with the results we obtain when we use actual,
average annual earnings data.
Working with a range of starting dates increases the difficulty of estimating the
convergence function in equation (5). In the five of the eight cases in which the sample
period starts more than ten years later than previously,40 actual and trend growth are too
collinear to allow simultaneous estimation of the trend and the convergence function.
Hence, we constrain g in (5) to be equal to the actual rate of growth between 1973 (the
first oil shock) and 2002 for the three countries which earnings data is available from
1955 onwards and between 1980 and 2002 for the other countries. We then estimate the
convergence function conditional on that prior, and use the values of the residuals of
the wage equation (5) along with those of the return to capital equation (7) to estimate
the coefficients of the VAR (8), and to extract the i.i.d. series which drive annual
income in each country. All eight real wage equations pass the same stationarity tests
to which the GDP based data were subjected.41 The fact that the wage and capital
innovations jointly determine the error terms in the wage and capital return equations
means that when wage data is only available for a shorter period, capital return data
39We also use this simulation algorithm to calculate quasi confidence intervals, conditional on the choice
ofRRA, for the values of ✓⇤ and S⇤ obtained. We take the maximum value of the expected life-time utility
of the representative agent in each country, and trace pairs of paygo tax and saving rates that cause expected
utility to be 99% of that maximum value. The exercise shows that the estimated utility function is relatively
flat, and that variations of +/- 10% of ✓⇤ are within this 99% confidence interval.
40See Table C1 for starting dates.
41Detailed results are available upon request.
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can also only be used for that shorter period. The counterpart to these shortcomings
is that the earnings data directly measures labor earnings, rather than a proxy for labor
earnings.
In Table C1, we compare rational paygo rates obtained from this earnings data with
the rational paygo rates derived in the text from GDP data. The two series display
similar cross-section characteristics. Each one, on its own, explains almost 80% of the
cross-section variance of effective rates presented in Table 1. The last two lines of the
table present the adjusted Root Mean Square Error of the linear and Poisson regressions
of effective on rational rates.
D The Implications of 2008
We examine the possible effects on paygo tax rates of incorporating the previously
ignored probability of a crisis. Using Barro and Ursua (2008) and Barro (2009), we
infer a binomial variable with a known probability of realization which simultaneously
generates two outcomes - a decline of GDP (our proxy for wage income) and a drop in
the return to capital.42 In steps 1 and 2 of the algorithm in Appendix B, we add draws
from this binomial distribution to the values of bxt and b"t derived from the population
of shocks previously estimated from data from 1950 to 2002. Each of the eight coun-
tries is characterised by its own population of “normal” shocks bxt and b"t.The binomial
distribution describing crises, which is added to those “normal” shocks, is the same
across countries (we only have one estimate), but we continue to simulate independent
life histories for each country.
Examination of Table D1 suggests that incorporating the expectation of low prob-
ability crises does not substantially change the calculus of rational individuals and au-
thorities. The new predicted paygo tax rates are similar to the old, though they are
everywhere slightly higher. Though expected utility declines, the trade-off between
paygo and saving remains substantially the same.
42Specifically, we refer to the data in Barro and Ursua (2008) on macroeconomic crises since 1870. Ac-
cording to Table 8 p.279, 70 crises have taken place in 17 OECD countries in the 136 years of history
examined, implying a probability of crisis equal to 3.0%. The corresponding average decline in GDP per
capita was 17.4% (Table 9 p.283). We estimate the shock to the stock price to be 22.9%, which is the average
decline among OECD countries during GDP crises as calculated from Table C2 p.323.
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Table 1: Effective Paygo Tax Rates
Effective Tax Rates
Australia 4.8
France 18.4
Germany 19.1
Italy 36.3
Japan 18.8
Spain 33.5
United Kingdom 10.9
United States 8.7
Source: OECD (2003), OECD labour force
participation projections and authors’ calcula-
tions.
Table 2: Unit Root Test Applied to Wage Innovations (five lags)
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Statistics Phillips-Perron Statistics
Australia -3.67*** -3.81***
France -3.70*** -3.37***
Germany -2.53** -2.62***
Italy -2.55** -2.65***
Japan -2.01** -2.67***
Spain -2.17** -4.82***
United Kingdom -2.93*** -2.39**
United States -2.65*** -2.06***
Note: *** (resp. **) represent significance at the 1% (resp. 5%) level. Critical values at
the 1% and 5% levels are respectively equal to -2.61 and -1.95 for augmented Dickey-
Fuller statistics and for Phillips-Perron statistics. The stationarity tests results presented
in this table are based on wage series constructed using GDP as a proxy for annual la-
bor earnings. Wage series using OECD (2016) data on actual labor earnings were also
tested for stationarity and are discussed in Appendix C.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 3: Annual Statistics
gˆ  ˆx Eˆr  ˆr/Eˆr ⇢xtxt 1 ⇢xt✏t 1 ⇢✏txt 1 ⇢✏t✏t 1
Australia 1.40% 0.049 6.38% 2.58 0.59*** 0.04 -1.06** 0.18
(0.12) (0.03) (0.46) (0.14)
France 1.59% 0.015 6.81% 2.74 0.67*** 0.00 -3.36* 0.17
(0.11) (0.01) (1.76) (0.14)
Germany 1.96% 0.030 7.55% 2.58 0.75*** 0.02 0.93 0.33**
(0.11) (0.02) (0.92) (0.14)
Italy 1.93% 0.030 4.12% 5.98 0.72*** 0.01 -0.21 0.35**
(0.11) (0.01) (1.20) (0.14)
Japan 1.90% 0.056 8.21% 2.48 0.76*** 0.01 -0.06 0.31**
(0.10) (0.03) (0.52) (0.14)
Spain 1.60% 0.034 5.59% 3.79 0.58*** 0.03 -0.70 0.59***
(0.12) (0.02) (0.80) (0.12)
United Kingdom 1.94% 0.034 6.78% 2.41 0.84*** 0.03 -1.15* 0.20
(0.08) (0.02) (0.66) (0.14)
United States 1.25% 0.028 7.45% 1.84 0.85*** 0.00 -1.88*** 0.17
(0.09) (0.02) (0.68) (0.14)
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. This table presents estimates of coefficients in
equations (5), (7) and (8). Wage series are constructed using GDP as a proxy for annual
labor earnings. gˆ is the estimate of the long-term growth rate of wages.  ˆx and  ˆr are
empirical estimates of the standard deviation of innovations xt and ✏t. Eˆr is the empir-
ical estimate of the expectation of ln(1 + rt). The estimates of the four VAR coefficients
are reported in columns 5-8.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 4: Effective and Predicted Paygo Tax Rates
Effective Tax
Predicted Paygo Tax
RRA=12 RRA=5
Australia 4.8 10.8 7.0
France 18.4 12.4 8.3
Germany 19.1 14.7 11.6
Italy 36.3 16.6 15.2
Japan 18.8 12.5 8.5
Spain 33.5 16.7 14.2
United Kingdom 10.9 9.2 5.5
United States 8.7 11.3 9.4
R2 - 83% 78%
Note: Predicted paygo tax rates, generated by Monte-Carlo simula-
tions with 1000 replications, assuming a relative risk aversion coeffi-
cient of 12 in column 2 and 5 in column 3. The last row reports the R2
of the linear regression of effective tax rates (column 1) on predicted
rational paygo tax rates.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Ta
bl
e
5:
C
ap
ita
lR
et
ur
n
Ef
fe
ct
s
Ef
fe
ct
iv
e
Pr
ed
ic
te
d
Ta
x
-R
R
A
=
12
Pr
ed
ic
te
d
Ta
x
-R
R
A
=
5
Eˆ
r
Ta
x
Ba
se
of
Sa
m
e
⌫ t
Sa
m
e
Ba
se
of
Sa
m
e
⌫ t
Sa
m
e
C
om
pa
ri
so
n
&
⇢ ✏
t
✏ t
 
1
Eˆ
r
C
om
pa
ri
so
n
&
⇢ ✏
t
✏ t
 
1
Eˆ
r
A
us
tr
al
ia
4.
8
11
.1
10
.4
10
.1
7.
8
5.
9
5.
5
6.
38
%
Fr
an
ce
18
.4
12
.3
10
.0
11
.6
8.
0
3.
4
6.
8
6.
81
%
G
er
m
an
y
19
.1
13
.6
8.
9
13
.6
9.
2
0.
8
9.
4
7.
55
%
It
al
y
36
.3
16
.6
15
.7
15
.0
15
.3
12
.7
11
.6
4.
12
%
Ja
pa
n
18
.8
12
.6
8.
5
13
.1
8.
6
0.
6
9.
8
8.
21
%
Sp
ai
n
33
.5
16
.8
13
.0
16
.0
14
.7
5.
7
12
.9
5.
59
%
U
ni
te
d
K
in
gd
om
10
.9
9.
6
9.
1
9.
0
6.
4
5.
1
5.
1
6.
78
%
U
ni
te
d
St
at
es
8.
7
8.
3
8.
3
8.
3
3.
0
3.
0
3.
0
7.
45
%
R
2
-
85
%
64
%
82
%
82
%
25
%
81
%
R
2
:R
ed
uc
tio
n
-
-
22
%
4%
-
57
%
1%
A
ve
ra
ge
18
.8
12
.6
10
.5
12
.1
9.
1
4.
7
8.
0
St
d.
D
ev
.
10
.5
2.
8
2.
4
2.
6
3.
8
3.
6
3.
2
St
d.
D
ev
./
A
vg
.
0.
56
0.
23
0.
23
0.
22
0.
42
0.
77
0.
40
N
ot
e:
Pr
ed
ic
te
d
pa
yg
o
ta
x
ra
te
s,
ge
ne
ra
te
d
by
M
on
te
-C
ar
lo
si
m
ul
at
io
ns
w
ith
10
00
re
pl
ic
at
io
ns
,a
ft
er
se
tt
in
g
cr
os
s-
VA
R
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
st
o
0,
as
su
m
in
g
a
re
la
tiv
e
ri
sk
av
er
si
on
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
of
12
in
co
lu
m
ns
2-
4
an
d
5
in
co
lu
m
ns
5-
7.
⌫ t
an
d
⇢ ✏
t
✏ t
 
1
ar
e
th
e
re
tu
rn
w
hi
te
no
is
e
an
d
VA
R
se
ri
al
co
rr
el
at
io
n
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
in
eq
.(
8)
.Eˆ
r
is
th
e
em
pi
ri
-
ca
le
st
im
at
e
of
th
e
ex
pe
ct
at
io
n
of
ln
(1
+
r t
)
in
eq
.(
7)
.R
2
is
th
e
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
of
th
e
lin
ea
r
re
gr
es
si
on
of
ef
fe
ct
iv
e
ta
x
ra
te
s
(c
ol
um
n
1)
on
pr
ed
ic
te
d
ra
tio
na
lp
ay
go
ta
x
ra
te
s.
Th
e
ro
w
R
2
:
R
ed
uc
tio
n
re
po
rt
s
th
e
dr
op
in
ex
-
pl
ai
ne
d
va
ri
an
ce
in
co
lu
m
ns
3-
4
re
la
tiv
e
to
co
lu
m
n
2
an
d
in
co
lu
m
ns
6-
7
re
la
tiv
e
to
co
lu
m
n
5.
St
d.
D
ev
.a
nd
A
vg
.r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y
st
an
d
fo
r
th
e
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
an
d
th
e
av
er
ag
e
of
th
e
pa
yg
o
ta
x
ra
te
s.
So
ur
ce
:
A
ut
ho
rs
’c
al
cu
la
tio
ns
.
Ta
bl
e
6:
La
bo
r
R
et
ur
n
Ef
fe
ct
s
Ef
fe
ct
iv
e
Pr
ed
ic
te
d
Ta
x
-R
R
A
=
12
Pr
ed
ic
te
d
Ta
x
-R
R
A
=
5
d
Ta
x
Ba
se
of
Sa
m
e
⌘ t
Sa
m
e
Ba
se
of
Sa
m
e
⌘ t
Sa
m
e
C
om
pa
ri
so
n
&
⇢ x
t
x
t 
1
d
C
om
pa
ri
so
n
&
⇢ x
t
x
t 
1
d
A
us
tr
al
ia
4.
8
11
.1
11
.1
12
.4
7.
8
7.
7
7.
2
27
.4
%
Fr
an
ce
18
.4
12
.3
12
.3
12
.3
8.
0
8.
0
8.
0
35
.0
%
G
er
m
an
y
19
.1
13
.6
13
.6
11
.7
9.
2
9.
2
9.
0
44
.8
%
It
al
y
36
.3
16
.6
16
.6
13
.5
15
.3
15
.3
13
.2
47
.0
%
Ja
pa
n
18
.8
12
.6
12
.5
11
.8
8.
6
8.
6
8.
5
39
.2
%
Sp
ai
n
33
.5
16
.8
16
.8
14
.3
14
.7
14
.7
13
.2
44
.4
%
U
ni
te
d
K
in
gd
om
10
.9
9.
6
9.
5
10
.5
6.
4
6.
3
5.
9
29
.3
%
U
ni
te
d
St
at
es
8.
7
8.
3
8.
2
9.
2
3.
0
3.
0
0.
5
23
.9
%
R
2
-
85
%
85
%
56
%
82
%
83
%
72
%
R
2
:R
ed
uc
tio
n
-
-
1%
29
%
-
-1
%
11
%
A
ve
ra
ge
18
.8
12
.6
12
.6
12
.0
9.
1
9.
1
8.
2
St
d.
D
ev
.
10
.5
2.
8
2.
9
1.
5
3.
8
3.
8
3.
8
St
d.
D
ev
./
A
vg
.
0.
56
0.
23
0.
23
0.
13
0.
42
0.
42
0.
47
N
ot
e:
Pr
ed
ic
te
d
pa
yg
o
ta
x
ra
te
s,
ge
ne
ra
te
d
by
M
on
te
-C
ar
lo
si
m
ul
at
io
ns
w
ith
10
00
re
pl
ic
at
io
ns
,a
ft
er
se
tt
in
g
cr
os
s-
VA
R
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
st
o
0,
as
su
m
in
g
a
re
la
tiv
e
ri
sk
av
er
si
on
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
of
12
in
co
lu
m
ns
2-
4
an
d
5
in
co
lu
m
ns
5-
7.
⌘ t
an
d
⇢ x
t
x
t 
1
ar
e
th
e
la
bo
r
w
hi
te
no
is
e
an
d
VA
R
se
ri
al
co
rr
el
at
io
n
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
in
eq
.
(8
).
d
is
th
e
de
pe
n-
de
nc
y
ra
te
.R
2
is
th
e
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
of
th
e
lin
ea
rr
eg
re
ss
io
n
of
ef
fe
ct
iv
e
ta
x
ra
te
s
(c
ol
um
n
1)
on
pr
ed
ic
te
d
ra
tio
na
l
pa
yg
o
ta
x
ra
te
s.
Th
e
ro
w
R
2
:
R
ed
uc
tio
n
re
po
rt
s
th
e
dr
op
in
ex
pl
ai
ne
d
va
ri
an
ce
in
co
lu
m
ns
3-
4
re
la
tiv
e
to
co
lu
m
n
2
an
d
in
co
lu
m
ns
6-
7
re
la
tiv
e
to
co
lu
m
n
5.
St
d.
D
ev
.
an
d
A
vg
.
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y
st
an
d
fo
r
th
e
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
an
d
th
e
av
er
ag
e
of
th
e
pa
yg
o
ta
x
ra
te
s.
So
ur
ce
:
A
ut
ho
rs
’c
al
cu
la
tio
ns
.
Table 7: Integration of financial markets (RRA=12)
Effective Base of U.S. Capital
S = 0Tax Comparison Market
Australia 4.8 11.1 8.8 14.0
France 18.4 12.3 9.0 15.9
Germany 19.1 13.6 9.1 17.2
Italy 36.3 16.6 9.5 17.9
Japan 18.8 12.6 9.4 16.1
Spain 33.5 16.8 9.6 18.7
United Kingdom 10.9 9.6 8.2 12.4
United States 8.7 8.3 8.3 13.1
Std. Dev. 10.5 2.8 0.5 2.1
Std. Dev./Avg. 0.56 0.23 0.05 0.14
Note: Predicted paygo tax rates, generated by Monte-Carlo simula-
tions with 1000 replications, after setting cross-VAR coefficients to 0,
assuming a relative risk aversion coefficient of 12. In column 3, ⌫t and
⇢✏t✏t 1 (eq. 8) and Eˆr (eq. 7) are everywhere set equal to their values
in the U.S. This simulation combines together the assumptions of the
simulations of column 3 and column 4 of Table 5. Std. Dev. and Avg.
respectively stand for the standard deviation and the average of the
paygo tax rates.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table B1: Predicted Rational Paygo and Saving Rates (in percent) for different RRA
Effective
Predicted Tax/Predicted Saving Rate
Tax RRA=5 8 10 12 15 20
Australia 4.8 7 9.4 10.3 10.8 11.2 11.8
5.1 3.1 2.4 2 1.6 1.1
France 18.4 8.3 10.9 11.8 12.4 13 13.4
4.9 3 2.4 1.9 1.5 1.1
Germany 19.1 11.6 13.7 14.3 14.7 15.1 15.4
3.6 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.1 0.8
Italy 36.3 15.2 16.2 16.4 16.6 16.7 16.8
2.1 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4
Japan 18.8 8.5 11 11.9 12.5 13.1 13.7
4.6 2.9 2.3 1.9 1.5 1.1
Spain 33.5 14.2 15.9 16.3 16.7 16.9 17
2.8 1.6 1.3 1 0.8 0.5
United Kingdom 10.9 5.5 7.8 8.7 9.2 9.7 10.1
4.9 3 2.3 1.9 1.5 1.1
United States 8.7 9.4 10.6 11 11.3 11.5 11.8
3 1.8 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.6
R2 - 78% 82% 83% 83% 84% 82%
Note: Predicted paygo tax rates, generated by Monte-Carlo simulations with 1000 repli-
cations, assuming a relative risk aversion coefficient varying from 5 in column 2 to 20
in column 7. The last row reports the R2 of the linear regression of effective tax rates
(column 1) on predicted rational paygo tax rates.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table C1: Predicted PaygoTax Rates : Comparison of GDP and Earnings
Based Estimates
RRA = 12 RRA = 5
GDP Earnings GDP Earnings
Based Based Based Based
Australia 11.6 13.6 8.8 8.1
(1964)
France 13.9 14.1 11.9 10.6
(1955)
Germany 16.5 16.6 16.0 10.1
(1970)
Italy 17.8 20.1 18.3 19.2
(1960)
Japan 14.9 14.0 14.1 8.2
(1960)
Spain 17.7 17.1 16.8 14.3
(1961)
United Kingdom 9.7 12.4 6.7 10.7
(1955)
United States 12.1 12.6 11.6 7.4
(1955)
R2 79% 79% 74% 77%
RMSE, Linear 5.6 5.6 6.1 5.8
RMSE, Poisson 4.3 6.2 4.9 6.6
Note: Predicted paygo tax rates, generated by Monte-Carlo simula-
tions with 1000 replications, assuming a relative risk aversion coeffi-
cient of 12 in columns 1-2 and 5 in columns 3-4. The sample period
goes from the year indicated under each country to 2002. The esti-
mates in columns 1 and 3 are the smaller-sample counterparts of the
predicted, rational rates presented in table 4. R2 is the R-squared of
the linear regression of effective tax rates on predicted rational paygo
tax rates. The last two rows report the Root Mean Square Error in the
linear regression (eq. 18) and in the Poisson regression (eq. 19).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table D1: Predicted PaygoTax Rates with and without Accounting for
the Risk of a Crisis (RRA=12)
Paygo Rate Assuming Paygo Tax Rate with
no Crisis Possible Crisis
Australia 10.8 11.5
France 12.4 12.9
Germany 14.7 15.1
Italy 16.6 16.8
Japan 12.5 13.0
Spain 16.7 16.9
United Kingdom 9.2 9.9
United States 11.3 11.7
Note: Column 1 reports the predicted rational tax rates shown in Ta-
ble 4, column 2. Crises have a binomial probability distribution and
are added to the national stochastic processes summarized in Table 3.
The predicted rational rates in the crisis experiment are presented in
column 2.
Source: Barro and Ursua (2009) and authors’ calculations.
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Figure 1 : Linear Model
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Figure 2 : Poisson Model
